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Abstract: The broadly used pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system is intrinsically wrong. The essence
of the problem is that the PAYG system distributes the yield of raising children, i.e., of human capital
investment (which is essentially the pension contribution), in such a way that it disregards the extent
to which individuals have contributed to this, and even whether it has occurred at all. This error can
be corrected if we take the pension contribution to be the yield on an investment of human capital, and
as such use this to pay back the costs and expenses of the raising of the contribution payer—overall
to those who paid these costs and expenses at the time. Accordingly, the central question of my study
is whether it is possible to construct a consistent pension system based on the above foundations, and
how my ideas may be inserted into the Diamond–Samuelson model. The method of the study was
logical analysis and the construction of a theoretical mathematical model. The results of the study
show that it is possible to construct a public pension system that operates according to a different
logic than today’s system, a system which is free from the effects of demographic fluctuations,
which does not motivate the refusal to have children, and which will remain self-sufficient under
all circumstances. The study achieves this by presenting a possible pension system of this kind in
detail. Via the suitable modification of the Diamond–Samuelson model, I have succeeded in showing
that the pension system I am proposing increases the willingness to have children up to the social
optimum, in contrast to the fully (but traditionally) funded and PAYG systems. This system currently
only exists in theory and may be regarded as a major theoretical innovation, which naturally has
certain (although not particularly extensive) antecedents. Its introduction could enable the resolution
of the contradictions of existing pension systems and could also provide a solution to the as yet
unsolved problem of the increasingly expensive regeneration of human capital, and as such, its
potential practical implications are immeasurable.
Keywords: pension reform; human capital; funding; PAYG systems
JEL Classification: H55; J11; J18
Notice
This study is the third part of a longer manuscript consisting of three parts, which
builds to a major extent on the first two parts, the English translation of which can be found
in the related Supporting Materials. It is expedient to begin by reading these. These two
parts (which are also understandable individually) have already been published, the first
originally in both Hungarian and English, and the second only in Hungarian, and I have
cited them in the References as Banyár (2019b, 2020).
1. Introduction
The most popular pension system worldwide today is the non-funded, pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) pension system, created in an ad-hoc manner by Roosevelt. The “official ideology”
of this system was provided by Samuelson (1958) almost two decades after its introduction,
greatly reassuring its operators, who until then had thought they were running a Ponzi
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scheme (Blackburn 2003) and felt that Samuelson had shown this was not the case (although
a article in The Economist (2017) praised Samuelson as the inventor of a “good” Ponzi
scheme.) According to Samuelson, the members of different generations had signed a social
contract according to which current active workers maintain the current older generation,
in exchange for which they can count on future active workers (the children of today, or
those not yet born) to also maintain them when they get old. In the model that underpins
the theory, Samuelson put forward the abstraction that the cost of raising children is zero
(their consumption forms part of their parents’ consumption).
In 2014, I presented the argument (Banyár 2014) that if we modify Samuelson’s model
a little and introduce the consumption of children, then we come to a totally different
pension system, which still shows many similarities to the PAYG system. A decisive
difference, however, is that this system is not unfunded; rather, it is funded using human
capital (HC). As a result, the most important problem of the PAYG system, its dependence
on demographics, is eliminated. I have demonstrated the errors of the PAYG system, and
the principles according to which an HC system should be constructed, in several studies
(Banyár 2016a, 2017, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c). However, the focus of these studies was always
a description of the problems associated with PAYG, and I was only able to explain in
a very limited manner how an HC system could actually be constructed. Below, I shall
attempt to correct this omission and to present how an HC system could be constructed.
To this end, I shall utilize elements that could also be useful in a well-operating PAYG
system, which I have explained in greater detail in Banyár (2020), although I have also
dealt with some of these in my previous works. These elements are: the introduction of
individual pension accounts (Banyár and Mészáros 2009); automatic age limit indexing;
the introduction of a quasi-mandatory, fully funded pension pillar; and the continuous,
as opposed to parallel, disbursement of the pensions acquired from this and the HC (or
PAYG) system (Banyár 2016b).
In support of my argument, moving beyond Banyár (2014), in which I modified the
original Samuelsonesque model, in Appendix A I have inserted the costs of raising a child
into the classic Diamond–Samuelson model, and shown how the HC model affects the
number of children (it increases it up to the social optimum) and young age consumption
(it also increases it, but more importantly it makes it independent from the number of
children), in comparison to the no pension model and PAYG models.
To facilitate the orientation of the reader, I have briefly summarized the most important
characteristics of the traditional PAYG system and the HC system I am proposing, which
I have discussed in detail in the Supplementary Materials, and the conclusions of which
are developed in this paper, in two tables. Table 1 compares the PAYG and HC systems,
and Table 2 presents the elements that I explained in detail in Banyár (2020) (the English
translation of which may be found in the Supplementary Materials) which I have built into
my proposal for the HC system described here, but which could also be applied within the
framework of a reformed PAYG system. In fact, some of these are already being used in
certain countries.
In the literature, numerous authors have already attempted to link the raising of
children and the pension system. Demény (1987) was the first to propose this, but his
solution was extremely simple, although this is precisely what made it attractive to many,
even today. Werding (2014), Giday and Szilvia (2018) and the Botos and Katalin (2020) put
forward complex proposals. Their recommendations differ from those set down in this
paper with relation to the principle (in my opinion mistaken) that the raising of children
is equivalent to the payment of contributions. In contrast, I regard contribution payment
as the return on the initial investment of human capital, which children are obliged to
(re)pay, but which does not make them eligible to receive a pension. In this regard, I am
fundamentally following Hyzl et al. (2005), who formulated an early version of what is
described below. The thoughts presented here also differ from the proposals for linking the
pension system to the raising of children put forward by practically all other authors with
respect to the fact that they regard the goal of such a system to be to encourage an increase
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in the number of births. This is clearly indicated by the title of the article by Regős (2015):
Can Fertility be Increased with a Pension Reform? I, however, believe that we must create a
pension system that remains in balance regardless of the number of births. I shall attempt
to do so below.
Table 1. The main characteristics of the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and human capital (HC) systems.
PAYG HC
A “pure” system, which is viable without other pension systems.
Only imaginable as a composite system; people with no or
few children still require a traditionally funded pension
subsystem.
According to the old approach: non-funded—the only one of its
kind from among the possible pension systems.
(Fully) funded, like all possible and rational pension
systems. The capital is the human capital of the raised, new
generation, which is repaid to the investors by its owners
(with interest).
According to the new approach: the capital behind the system is an
implicit sovereign debt, which is huge, 2–4 times the annual GDP,
because of which its value is often kept secret, although within the
EU it has been mandatory to indicate this since 2017.
In view of the above, the implicit (and explicit) sovereign
debt behind the system is 0.
The basis of the pension is the contribution payment capacity of the
new generation, but this has not been built into the system,
meaning the level of individual pensions is not dependent on this.
The basis of the pension is the social security contribution
payment capacity of the new generation, which has been
explicitly built into the system, meaning that the level of
individual pensions is dependent on the investment made
towards the creation of contribution-payers.
Motivates depopulation because it makes it economically irrational
to raise children.
Compared to the existing situation, it encourages the
maintaining of a stable population, but in a general sense it
makes it economically neutral whether people raise children
or provide for their pension in some other manner.
Based on a contradiction, because although it assumes and requires
an increasing population, it in fact encourages a decrease in
population, meaning it is highly vulnerable to demographic
changes that are mistakenly regarded as exogenic factors.
Logically coherent, neutral to demographic changes (that
are regarded as endogenic by the system); will adapt to the
changes whether the population increases or decreases.
Only the ratio of systems funded with human and
traditional capital will change.
Economic policy is seemingly free to determine the volume of
pension to be distributed, and thereby the level of the average
pension.
The volume of the pension is more or less given as the
estimated value of the investment in human capital and the
interest on that investment, which people pay as a
contribution during a determined period of their working
lives.
Often realizes an unfair distribution of burdens between
generations.
Represents a fair distribution of burdens between
generations.
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Table 2. The specialties of the HC system I am proposing in this paper, which would also be worthwhile introducing in
traditional PAYG systems.
Traditional PAYG System Reformed PAYG System HC System as Proposed Here
No individual account
Individual account, where the paid
contribution is accumulated and
valorized.
Individual account, where the paid
contribution is accumulated and
valorized.
Defined benefit (DB) in character—the
contribution is determined based on an
index series (usually the period of
employment, the level of contributions of
a chosen period, etc.).
Defined contribution (DC) in character.
The pension is determined exclusively
based on total contributions and life
expectancy. Specifically, a Non-financial
Defined Contribution (NDC) or point
system (practically: a defined
contribution that resembles defined
benefit).
DC in character, and specifically a point
system. But in this case, keeping records
of contributions serves for the recording
of obligations, not entitlements, meaning
that they generate no points.
The entitlements, which are recorded
using points, are proportionate to the
period and results (the child’s
qualifications) of child-raising.
Individual pension—rights are acquired
by everyone based on individual
performance.
Family pension. The acquisition of rights
by spouses during their marriage is a
joint performance, which is halved if they
become divorced, and which is inherited
by the widow on the death of the spouse.
In view of the joint acquisition of rights,
the pension is a joint annuity. There is no
separate widow’s pension.
Family pension. The acquisition of rights
by spouses during their marriage is a
joint performance. Joint annuity, without
a separate widow’s pension.
Fixed age of retirement that is corrected
at great intervals.
Continuous retirement age indexing
based on changes (practically: increases)
in life expectancy.
Continuous retirement age indexing
based on changes (practically: increases)
in life expectancy.
Has no funded subsystem, but there are
also funded pension systems operating
parallel to it that are not integrated into
the system.
Has a subsystem that is funded
(traditionally, not with human capital),
and which is proportionally the same for
everybody.
Has a subsystem that is funded
(traditionally, not with human capital),
but the size of this changes on an
individual basis, depending on the
number of children.
The pensions of the PAYG and funded
pension systems are paid out parallel to
each other.
(Potentially, because no such
international example exists as yet,) the
pensions received from the funded and
PAYG systems are paid out consecutively
in such a manner that the level of the
pension is equalized during the full
pension period. Upon reaching the
normal age of retirement, the capital of
the funded system is first spent as a
phased withdrawal (or possibly saved),
following which payment of the higher
pension (in view of the higher age limit)
begins from the state system upon
reaching the higher age of retirement.
The pensions received from the funded
and PAYG systems are paid consecutively
in the manner explained previously.
2. Should We Disburse the Profits of Child-Raising or Not?
First of all it is important to note that the current paper uses the term “child-raising”
throughout, rather than “having a child”. By doing so, I would like to emphasize the
fact that only efforts aimed at raising a child count, and it is not even relevant whether
someone is the biological parent of the raised child. In other words, if someone is the
biological parent of several children but does not raise them, they are not due any kind
of pension. Accordingly, it is also inconsequential if someone cannot have children for
biological reasons, because the opportunity to raise children via adoption is nevertheless
open to them.
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It is in theory very simple to link the raising of children to pensions—children should
maintain their parents in their old age, just as their parents theoretically used to do for
them. Thus, when we call for the two to be linked, there immediately arises a simple
and obvious solution, the alternative of which is for the state to pay out the profits of
child-raising among pensioners, while applying risk balancing. In the following, I examine
whether such a solution is expedient.
A legislative declaration, such as the one already in existence in China (Constitution
2004, Article 49), and also in Hungary’s Fundamental Law (“Article XVI . . . [3] Parents
shall be obliged to care for their minor children . . . [4] Adult children shall be obliged to
care for their needy parents”) is sufficient to achieve the simple and obvious solution. This
may be truly interpreted in this manner in China, but certainly not in Hungary, or at least
not for the moment. However, the issue also has theoretical followers.
For example, in his logic Pál Demény, who was the first to internationally raise the
linking of child-raising and pensions, recommends a similar, but much less strict system
(Demény 1987). He suggested that part of the child’s contribution should be transferred to
his/her pensioner parents, meaning that a direct link is established between the child’s
contribution payments and the parents’ pension. This was criticized and also further
developed by Julian L. Simon, according to whom parents and their children should sign a
contract whereby parents finance the university studies of their child, in return for which
the child will provide the parent with a pension (Simon 1988).
Truly, nothing could encourage the high-quality raising of children more than if
parents were to strive to raise their children in such a way that they will be able to earn as
much as possible. However, this method would introduce an uncertainty into pensions,
and would make both burdens and profits highly uneven. If someone’s parents were to die
early, they would not have to pay anything, but if they live a long life, they would have to
pay a great deal. Parents may already have reached retirement age while their child is still
studying, so regardless of how well they may have raised their child, they will not have a
pension. Some children may refrain from making the required payments, the child may
die, etc. It is therefore expedient to balance both burdens and profits, i.e., to operate the
HC system similarly to today’s state pension system, and accordingly I shall refrain from
examining the simple solution below but shall instead put forward a proposal for a system
that disburses profits.
3. The Cost of Raising a Child
Since the logic of the HC system (which should have intrinsically been the logic of
the PAYG system) is that the pension is the return on the raising of children, as a form of
capital investment, a prerequisite of the system’s operation is that we assess as exactly as
possible the cost of raising a child. This is also what we shall do here, although for the
moment only at a theoretical level, without concrete numbers.
It is obvious that the cost of raising individual children requires significantly different
material and temporal investments, and it is also difficult to distinguish which of these
are necessary, superfluous or possibly have a negative return. The extent of state funding
received towards this end also differs in view of the fact that child-raising subsidies are
neither automatic, nor of a uniform level, for instance, in the case of income-dependent
tax concessions.
However, the individual costs are in fact unimportant, just as in the case of other
“goods”, where, at least in principle, a uniform market price prevails. Of course, human
capital has no market, but using the market price as an analogy we are able to establish
a standard cost, with monitoring, continuous measurements and corrections. During
the course of measurement, we must take into account the child’s average consumption
(food, clothing, accommodation, etc.), the cost of their education and medical care and the
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time parents1 spend on raising them. An important separate issue is what share of this is
borne by the “public” (i.e., the average taxpayer) and by the parents. The public’s share is
primarily realized via nursery school, school, healthcare and transfers relating to the child
(family subsidies, child-related tax concessions, funding towards the purchase of a family
home or car, etc.).
An important question of principle also arises here: should we take the fact that the
pension is the repayment of the costs of child-raising literally, or in a broad sense? If we
take it literally, then it is very important to assess the average costs as precisely as possible,
and in fact, if we regard these as an investment, then we must also calculate and assign
some kind of return to them. If we interpret it in a broad sense, however, then it is sufficient
to calculate the distribution of the costs in relation to private contributions (essentially the
money and time spent by parents) and public contributions.
As a first step, it is expedient to satisfy ourselves with the broad approach. Therefore,
we assume (which should be calculated in reverse) that the current average level of the
(state) pension, multiplied by the average number of years spent in retirement, is roughly
equivalent to the value, with interest, of the cost of raising a child (two per married couple).
This is admittedly a practical approach, not a theoretical one. The justification is that if we
embark on a program of precise assessment, a set of extremely difficult questions will be
opened, which are capable of making the system highly complex, and could pose a barrier
to its realization. Nevertheless, the possibility of later, precise assessments must be left
open, as must the opportunity to gradually adjust the system to this, since we must strive
for theoretical solutions, but must be aware of the fact that there will occasionally be a need
for practical (and possibly temporary) simplification (just as in all social systems).
The principle of the non-broad approach would otherwise be as follows: a general
balance is realized between the human capital investment and the total contribution volume
paid by the raised child. This may be defined as a very general balance equation (let us call
it the GBE), according to which
the cost (with interest) of raising a generation = the discounted value of the
total contribution volume expected to be paid by the generation (in the
manner set down in the contribution payment regulations)
As a result of the above, a condition for the system’s operation is that these costs are
continuously measured and calculated. When the basic parameters are set at the launch of
the system, we may begin by applying the abovementioned broad estimate, but will have
to calculate increasingly precise values as time goes on (which is also an important issue
with relation to the system’s legitimacy).
During the application of the GBE, we must obviously also take into account the fact
that some children will never become contribution-payers, because they unfortunately
die as children, or are born disabled or become disabled. This, however, is one of the
intrinsic risk factors of raising children, and accordingly it is expedient also to include in
the equation deceased children and the costs of raising disabled children.
It may also occur that a child who has been raised and has become a contribution-
payer dies during the course of their active career, and accordingly this mortality must also
be taken into account on the right side of the GBE. Children who have remained alive must
(partly) repay the costs of being raised in their place.
Furthermore, some kind of equitable interest rate must also be applied. A logical
candidate is the average wage index, since this may be regarded as the rate at which the
value of human capital increases each year on average.
1 For simplicity, I have used the term “parents”, but I am of course aware that some children are raised by only one parent. In such cases, all of the
effort that went into the raising of the child must be credited to this one parent. Similarly, the identity and number of foster parents may change
with time, and accordingly the raising of a child may be distributed among several people, which is something that the system must handle. It is
also important to highlight the fact that the term “parent” does not necessarily refer to a child’s biological parent(s), but simply denotes the person
or persons who actually perform the raising of the child, without receiving any special remuneration in exchange for doing so. In the vast majority
of cases, these are the biological parents of the child, and this is why we have simplified the use of the term in such a way.
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A result of the calculation that is already necessary initially is the ratio of individual (i)
and public (p) efforts with relation to raising a child, where i + p = 1. This ratio must also
be continuously measured and actualized. In addition, individual efforts are in the most
part not financial, but are made in the form of time spent, which may be converted into
money using opportunity cost, for instance, how much the parent would have earned if
they had been employed at a workplace during this time. Public expenditure must include
the transfers received with relation to the child (the various maternity leave and childcare
benefits), the tax concessions utilized, the costs of the child’s free education and healthcare,
etc. These may of course change with time in line with changes in regulations. In the
beginning, in Hungary, we recommend the application of a ratio of 1.9:1 = 0.66–0.34, which
is an estimate based on the Hungarian data currently available (Gál and Márton 2019).
This means that according to surveys, in Hungary the individual effort with relation
to raising children is 1.9 times that of community effort, meaning that parents spend
1.9 times a much time and money on raising their children (on average) than they are
repaid by society for doing so, i.e., what may be regarded as the taxpayers’ contribution.
The community effort is a result of the fact that in Hungary, as in most developed countries,
social protection schemes reward families with children in a number of ways, including
child-care specific benefits, unconditional basic income, publicly subsidized childcare,
tax credits for families raising children, child or family allowances and the provision of
maternity and paternity leave.
4. Repaying the Cost of Being Raised—The Place of Contributions within the
HC System
4.1. Uniform Contribution Rate with No Upper Threshold, Uniform Contribution Payment Period
Based on the GBE, we may also determine the level of contributions. Two parameters
are important here: for what period must contributions be paid, and with relation to what
proportion of income?
Above, we have already discarded the idea that a child must repay exactly the amount
that their parents and society have spent on him/her. Instead, we recommend the use of the
“results approach” used in the case of venture capital investment, from which it follows that
it is expedient for the contribution to be a set percentage of income (just as occurs today)
and there is no justification for imposing an upper threshold on the contribution level.
However, in the case of the HC system, it is not justified for the period of the contribu-
tion payment to be the full lifetime spent in active employment, as is the case in the PAYG
system. Because today this is primarily what supports the fact that the service provided
should also be in proportion to this. In this HC system, however, the pension is exclusively
dependent on child-raising efforts, and not on contributions. The contribution does not
belong to the investment “side”, but exclusively to the system’s return “side”.
In other words, repayment is the obligation of all raised children, and this must
be set down from some perspective. If the amount is not fixed, then the total period of
contribution payment could be. Of course, what this fixed period should be is a parameter
that may be chosen relatively freely. The restriction is that the lower it is, the higher the
contribution rate (based on the GBE). Hereafter, we recommend using a period of 30 or
35 years.
4.2. Handling Exceptions—If Someone Is Unable to Pay Contributions for a Sufficient Period
There of course exist a number of cases in which someone is unable or unwilling to
pay their contributions until the end of the uniform contribution payment period, meaning
they are unable or unwilling to repay the cost of having been raised. The most important
cases include if someone dies at working age, if they become temporarily ill for a long
period, or are permanently disabled, unemployed, are raising a child, move abroad or
launch a business from which they receive no income in the form of a wage. Within
the system, we may handle these cases in three ways. We may regard them as part of
the system’s risks and distribute them among the other participants, we may attempt to
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compensate for them somehow or we may exclude the affected parents from receiving
pension services. The question is, in which category should we place these individual
cases? Below, we shall attempt to fit the most important cases into these three categories
and to justify this categorization.
4.2.1. The Distribution of Risk
It is expedient to handle exceptions that are beyond the individual’s control by dis-
tributing the risk within the risk community. Early death and disability are clearly such
cases. The probability of these occurring must be included on the right side of the GBE—
this is the method by which the risk is distributed. It is questionable whether illness and
unemployment should also be included in this category. An argument for doing so is that
these can (generally) also not be controlled by the individual, whereas an argument against
it is the fact that even in this case, they still have some form of income into which the
contribution may be incorporated. In the first case, this is also included in the probabilities
found on the right side of the GBE, whereas in the latter case these two factors are moved
to the compensation category.
It is not really expedient to apply risk distribution in the case of someone raising a
child (some other solution must be applied instead) because by doing so, in contrast to
the PAYG system, which is unfair to people who raise children, the HC system would risk
making the opposite mistake: becoming unfair with respect to people who do not raise
children. In such a case it would place a double burden on them: they do not receive a
pension as a result of having raised a child, in addition to which they would also have to
pay part of their parents’ contributions (i.e., what their parents owe to their own parents).
In this context it is interesting and somewhat ironic that this study regards the greatest
fault of the PAYG system to be that it distributes the risk of not raising children, but Hans-
Werner Sinn, who also formulated arguments in favor of linking the raising of children to
the pension system, regards it as its greatest advantage—see Sinn (1998).
4.2.2. Compensating the Non-Payment of Contributions
Overall, it may be stated that we must strive to handle the majority of exceptions
through compensation, because by doing so the contribution rate will not increase, nor will
the pension decrease, and fewer people will have to be excluded from receiving a pension.
Illness, Unemployment
In the case of long-term but temporary illness or unemployment, compensation may
come from two sources, and these are non-exclusive. The required pension contribution
may be built into their sickness benefit or unemployment benefit. In such cases, the basis
for the contribution is the same income that forms the basis for the sickness benefit or
unemployment benefit. By doing so, we of course still distribute the risk of contribution
non-payment, but not among the contribution-payers, but among those from whom we
collect the consideration relating to these two benefits.
The other possibility is that we extend the contribution payment period and extend
it into the pension payment period for a time. In practice, this means that we deduct
the missing contributions from the pension benefit with relation to the missing years.
In view of the fact that a pension can have two sources, the HC and FF (fully funded)
systems, and the latter would precede the former, meaning the primary source for the
missing contributions would be the savings accumulated within the FF system. In such
cases, the level of contribution may be the value of the average contribution paid until that
time, valorized using the average wage index (but of course not exceeding the value of
the pension).
Contribution Jointly with Spouse, and/or Grandparent’s Pension from the
Parent’s Pension
When someone is raising a child (and the child is still so small that one of the parents is
unable to work parallel to raising the child) and this period conflicts with the contribution
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payment period (which we otherwise strive to avoid when planning the system), the parent
in question may only receive a temporary exemption from having to pay a contribution, but
their obligations remain. This situation may be handled in several ways, among which it is
expedient to establish a kind or order of priority, meaning we must begin by applying the
first method, then move on to the second method once we have depleted all the possibilities
afforded by the first. The third method may be chosen freely above a certain number of
children (e.g., three). These methods are:
1. If the spouse of the parent who is raising the child full time is working, then the con-
tribution paid by the working spouse must be regarded as a joint contribution. This
means that we accept the one-year contribution payment of the spouse as covering
them both, but only for a 6-month period, meaning that the contribution payment
period of both parents will be extended by six months. This also means that the parent
who remains home with the child (generally the mother), does not fall behind with
relation to fulfilling his/her commitments compared to the parent who continues to
work during this period (usually the father), meaning the system is already intrin-
sically more equitable than the current one. The logic of the method is absolutely
parallel to the family pension system mentioned in the introduction and detailed in
Banyár (2020). In such cases, the level of contribution is given. As a supplementary
solution, it is worth allowing the working spouse to pay a larger than necessary
contribution during this period. The higher the contribution paid, the more years the
system regards as having been paid in contributions from the mandatory number,
also with regard to both parents.
2. If despite this there still remain a few years of contribution payment obligation when
the parent reaches the age of retirement, then the contribution may be deducted from
the pension in the same manner as described in the point above, as recommended in
the case of unemployment or long-term illness. Here too, the level of contribution is
equal to the valorized average of the level of contributions paid during the individual’s
working career, as above in the case of illness. If their contribution was partly paid in
their place by their spouse, it is this level of contribution that will be included in the
average calculation for the given period.
3. The introduction of a full-time mother program on a market basis, without state
funding. In view of its length, this solution is detailed separately below.
Full-Time Mother Program on a Market Basis, without State Funding
In most cases, people will fall behind with their contribution payments with relation
to raising children because they raise a large number of children and simply do not have
the time to work (or at least, not for a long enough time), and as a result will be unable to
repay the costs of their having been raised. If someone gradually finds themselves in such
a position and would not like their pensions to decrease to an uncertain extent, there comes
the third method, whereby they come to an agreement with a (generally childless) external
sponsor (ES) with relation to the fact that the latter will pay a regular sum appropriate to
the average cost of raising a child with respect to one (or more) of the children, until they
are fully raised.
In the case of such an agreement, if the parents have not yet fulfilled their contribution
payment obligation, a sum equivalent to the monthly average contribution must be de-
ducted from the monthly sum paid by the ES in the interests of fulfilling their contribution
payment obligation. The relationship between the average monthly cost of raising a child
and the average monthly contribution can be easily calculated using the GBE.
The ES is motivated to conclude such an agreement in the interests of purchasing
pension points as a result (one for each child sponsored until they are fully raised), because
by doing so raising the child will not count towards the parents’ pension, but towards
the ES’s pension. This means that by doing so the ES can participate in the raising of the
new generation without actually raising a child; it can entrust this to people who are more
willing to do so than they are. Accordingly, this could essentially enable the establishment
Risks 2021, 9, 66 10 of 32
of a “market-based, full-time mother program” without the need for state funding. The
role of the state would be restricted to, for instance, facilitating contact between “supply
and “demand” via a special website.
It is important to note that by entering into such an agreement the ES also undertakes
a kind of “investment” risk, just as parents also generally do, because, in view of reasons
to be explained later, pension points would only be due with respect to children who
acquire at least a secondary school leaving certificate level of education. Therefore, if the ES
sponsors a child who will be incapable of this, then their investment will be worth nothing.
The question may occur: why not make things simpler by simply accepting the
raising of one of the children as contribution payment? The answer is that this solution
may create the equivalence of rights and obligations at an individual level, but it would
cause financial problems at the system level. In this instance, the missing contribution
would have to be deducted from the contributions already paid by current pensioners and
would therefore increase the later pension of current active workers without them having
worked for it, since the contribution payments of the child raised in lieu of the payment of
contributions would now be providing them (current active workers) with a pension. This
would essentially include the same mistaken solution into the HC system which generally
characterizes the PAYG system, and which we are precisely aiming to correct with the HC
system. This is true despite the fact that there will otherwise be a kind of generational
“hiccup” in the system in view of the fact that there may be a significant variance in the
age at which people have children (particularly in the case of men), and because in certain
cases the payment of contributions may extend into retirement age. However, in theory
these cases will balance each other out in the long term.
Income Not Derived from Employment
Unfortunately, this problem is a general problem relating to today’s system of em-
ployment pensions and affects both the PAYG and HC systems, and we do not provide a
general solution to the problem here, but simply indicate that some kind of solution must
be found for cases in which someone’s income is not derived from a working wage, and
as a result they do not pay any contributions. This is also problematic because they may
raise a child and will become eligible for a pension as a result. However, they may pay
the unpaid contributions in installments out of this pension, as detailed above. Another
possibility is that we introduce some kind of contribution payment for such autonomous
people, either in the form of a flat rate, or dependent on income at some level.
When Children Move Abroad
If a child moves to another country, works there and pays contributions there, then
the cost of raising them does not generate a return at home; it is as if they had never been
born, and accordingly—in the first instance—no pension benefits will be due with respect
to such children, and parents must be excluded from receiving a pension (with respect to
the child in question). However, it may not necessarily be expedient to act in this manner,
even though for practical reasons we do suggest that the risk of moving abroad should not
be distributed among the risk community.
Moving abroad is the best indication of the extent to which the ideology of the PAYG
system is false, because according to the system in such a case there is absolutely no
problem here; the child who has moved abroad pays into the social security system there,
based on which they will become eligible to receive a pension there. It is, however, obvious
that what in fact happens in this case is that the social security balance of host countries is
improved by workers who move there, whereas the social security balance of the countries
they leave behind becomes worse. It might be stated that the worsening social security
balance of the host country could be saved—at least for a time—using this method, to the
detriment of the sending countries. It means that the cost of investing in children is borne
by one country, but its profits are reaped by the other country.
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This is in itself a sufficient argument for switching from the PAYG system to the HC
system, because this uncovers yet another failure, and in fact an implicit background
assumption, of the PAYG system—the fact that it assumes a closed economy, one from/to
which employees do not come and go at will. Meaning that, for instance, the PAYG system
and the EU’s “freedoms” are not compatible with each other, or rather only to the extent
that they favor developed EU countries in a one-sided manner, since the workforces of less
developed EU countries are fundamentally flowing into these better developed countries
(Banyár 2014).
The problem could, however, in theory be solved if the net sending countries affected
were to initiate negotiations for EU internal regulations that ensured that the pension
contributions of young people who emigrate (or at least part of them) continue to be paid
into the social security system of the sending country for a certain period. If such an
agreement is successfully concluded, then parents whose children move abroad will not
have to be excluded from the pension system. The most expedient would be a regulation
of this nature that extends to the whole of the EU, which could be jointly initiated by the
net source countries of intra-EU migration. Later, similar agreements may be initiated with
other countries based on the intra-EU agreement. Without an agreement (or if someone
emigrates to a country with which no such agreement exists), the following method may
be applied.
4.2.3. Exclusion from Pension Services
If, however, such an international agreement is not possible, it is recommended that
exclusion and not risk distribution be applied with relation to children who move abroad,
since this is the result of a conscious decision, and not analogous to a child becoming
disabled or dying. There are naturally also certain technical problems in this instance,
which must be solved later, because working abroad may also be temporary, after which
people return home, in which case exclusion from receiving pension services is not an
expedient solution.
It is prudent for young people who have moved abroad for the long term to expect to
have to compensate their parents for their lost pensions themselves, via direct transfers,
meaning that when they calculate the profits and expenses associated with moving to
another country, they should also take this into account on the expenses side (and the
attention of all young people must be drawn to this in a timely manner).
Children moving abroad is the main cause for exclusion from pension services, but
other, hopefully very rare, cases may also occur. These include if the fact that the child
becomes unable to pay contributions is a direct result of the actions of the parent(s) or
the person who raises them, e.g., if they become disabled or a criminal. Of course, in the
majority of such cases this is not the fault of the parent and accordingly it must be duly
assessed, possibly via an individual decision with the involvement of the courts, whether
or not this is in fact the case in a concrete instance.
5. The Distribution of Contributions: Pension Services within the HC System
The GBE not only determines the level of contributions, but also the level of pen-
sion services, providing we determine the most important principles with relation to
distribution, and based on those the following rules.
5.1. Current Financing May Remain as the Principle for Distribution
The first principle may be that each year it is expedient to disburse the contributions
that have been paid during that year in the form of a pension, since these contributions now
represent a kind of “dividend” (and of course also “partial repayment”). In this respect, the
HC system is similar to the PAYG system. It fundamentally requires no separate financial
reserve in view of the fact that its actual reserve is human capital (in an acknowledged
manner, and in this regard, it differs radically from the PAYG system).
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5.2. Pension Benefit Indexing Is Automatic, but There Are Conditions to This
Pension benefits do not need to be indexed separately in view of the fact that they
are automatically indexed in relation to changes in the volume of contributions paid in
during the given year. If the system’s parameters are set up well, then the automatic index
will be the wage index (with minor fluctuations), since the volume of contributions will
increase parallel to this, regardless of any of its other unchanged factors. Many things will
change, of course, but these changes are partly neutralized automatically, and may in part
be neutralized through clever regulation.
Changes in the number of active workers will be automatically neutralized in view
of the fact that this is also mirrored in the number of people who are eligible to receive a
pension. If fewer children are born, the HC system will have fewer eligible participants,
and more people will receive services from the FF system (or rather, in practice they will
receive services for a shorter period from the HC system and for a longer period via the FF
system, according to the concrete proposal).
The automatic age limit indexing proposed in Banyár (2020) and mentioned in the
introduction (meaning that we always increase the age of retirement to ensure that the
expected remaining lifetime at that age threshold remains a fixed value) enables us to
neutralize the increased lifetime effect, as a result of which we would have to distribute
the same volume of contributions over an increasingly longer period. If we can count
on the number of years in retirement remaining constant on average, then the pension
services will not change as a result of an increase in lifetime, because the ratio of years
spent paying contributions and years spent receiving pension services remains constant. If,
for instance, we set the expected years receiving a pension at 15 or 17.5 and the number of
years of contribution payment to 30 or 35 (as recommended above), then their ratio will be
a constant 2, meaning the pension received with relation to a raised child (per head in case
of a married couple) will remain stable at roughly twice the average contribution (at least in
the case of contributions paid for one person—see explanation regarding family pensions).
5.3. The Recommended Method for Distributing Contributions into Pensions Is a Kind of
Points System
It is expedient for pensions to be such that the pensions received by various gener-
ations of retirees do not diverge as they do within the current Hungarian PAYG system.
This means that someone receives the same pension in a given year with respect to having
raised the same number of children regardless of whether they retired 20 years ago or
whether the pension has only recently been determined for them. This problem is solved
very well by the German points system, and accordingly we recommend its adaptation.
However, the German points system currently serves a classic PAYG system, meaning
that points may be received with relation to the payment of contributions. Within the HC
system, however, eligibility for a pension is not acquired in exchange for the payment of
contributions, but only with respect to raising children, and accordingly the points (let
us call them “pension points”) can only be distributed based on an investment towards
raising a child.
5.4. Principles behind the Distribution of Pension Points
The primary principle is that we must differentiate between points that are awarded
based on individual (i) and community (c) contributions. The ratio of individual and
community pensions points awarded with respect to the raising of a child is i/c.
5.4.1. Pension Points (Based on an Individual Contribution) That Are Due Directly with
Respect to Raising Children
For the sake of simplicity, let us determine the value of a pension point as being due
with respect to an individual contribution towards the raising of a child until it reaches the
age of 18, providing the child has acquired at least a secondary school leaving certificate.
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I believe it is worth considering the possibility that no pension points should be due
for levels of education lower than a secondary school leaving certificate, or that in such
cases it should only be possible to acquire points following a separate procedure. The
justification for this is that in today’s economic conditions it is practically certain that a
child who does not even reach the level of a secondary school leaving certificate will never
become a contribution-payer, meaning that an investment in such a child will not provide
a return. From a different perspective, however, this regulation would strongly motivate
both parents and children to acquire at least a secondary school leaving certificate, even
after the age of 18. In such cases, parents would receive their single pension point at a
later date. If it transpires that a child who lacks a secondary school leaving certificate has
nevertheless become a good contribution-payer, then following a sufficiently long period
(to be defined later) of performing as a good contribution-payer, it should be made possible
for a request to be submitted enabling the parents to receive their pension point.
It is not fully clear whether we should differentiate further between children based on
their level of education, or according to what criteria we should differentiate between (adult)
children. In favor of differentiation based on the level of education is the fact that there are
major differences between people who only have a secondary school leaving certificate and
people with higher education diplomas with relation to average income (and accordingly,
the level of contribution paid). An argument against this differentiation, however, is the
fact that this could give rise to large individual differences, which could lead to tensions. It
is almost certain that in the case of such a differentiation unemployed university graduates,
with respect to whom their parents receive higher-than-average pensions, and people with
only secondary school leaving certificates, who are exceptional contribution-payers but
whose parents receive much more modest pensions, will be paraded on television.
For this reason, we recommend considering the supplementation of this differentiation
with a bonus system, according to which we intrinsically increase the pension point linked
to a secondary school leaving certificate in proportion to the time required to achieve a
higher level of education. In other words, a parent (both parents together) whose child
acquires a basic level (bachelor’s) degree should receive 21/18 pension points in view of
the fact that to acquire a bachelor’s degree parents must maintain their child at least until
the age of 21, and parents whose child achieves a master’s degree should receive 23/18
pension points for similar reasons. The fact that someone only acquires a bachelor’s degree
at, for instance, the age of 28 and lives with their parents until that time need not, and in
fact must not, be rewarded by the system with a higher number of points.
It is expedient to split the (one whole or somewhat larger) pension point received with
respect to one child between those participating in the raising of that child on a pro rata
temporis basis (or at least, when the system begins operating, it should not be examined
whether or not the contribution fluctuates according to the age of the child). If a married
couple raise the child together, they share the point equally. If a parent has raised their
child alone, they receive the whole point. If they are divorced, but continue to raise the
child together, then they will also continue to share the point equally; if they do not share
in the raising of the child equally, then they will share the pension point on a pro rata basis
for the period during which they are not raising the child together. For instance, if someone
is only paying alimony, then they and their partner-parent will share the fraction points in
a ratio of 0.3–0.7 (it is expedient to determine and continuously maintain the precise figure
via assessments). If a parent is not even paying alimony, then the parent who is raising the
child will receive everything with relation to the raising of the child.
The points of a parent who has died will be transferred to the parent with whom they
have been raising the child until that time. If the child is later adopted by another parent,
then the adopting parent will from then on receive fraction points on a pro rata basis.
The same rule applies in the case of children who are not the parent’s biological
child but are adopted. No pension points are due with respect to fostered children, in
consideration of whom the state pays a fostering allowance.
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It would be logical for pension points to be due with respect to the actual level of
contribution payments, but in many cases, this is impossible, since the parent may already
have retired some time ago, but the child is not yet paying contributions, or because the
level of contributions may change continuously, or even fluctuate wildly in line with the
level of payments realized by the child. It would not be expedient for all this to be mirrored
in pension services. At the same time, it is absolutely justified, and easily derivable from
the basic principles of the recommended system, that parents whose children earn an
outstanding income, and therefore pay an outstandingly high level of contributions, should
also receive a higher pension. However, the demand for someone’s pension to be reduced
simply because their child’s career (and therefore their contribution) has encountered a
fracture, or because they have given up their highly paying workplace to take on a job
that generates a high social profit, but is badly paid, is problematic. In view of the above,
we do not recommend directly linking pensions to children’s contribution payments (as
suggested by Demény (1987) and those who accept his logic), but it is instead expedient
to introduce a kind of bonus system (without a malus system). This means that parents
should not lose any additional pension they may have received even if the child’s salary
is reduced in the meantime. However, this also means that bonuses may only increase
the level of pensions tentatively. One possibility is that parents should receive additional
fraction points with respect to their child if the child’s income is, for instance, at least double
the average contribution for a period of three years. This additional fraction point could
be proportional to how many times the contribution exceeded the average contribution
(provided it is at least twice the average) and could increase continuously in accordance
with the period during which the contribution is higher than double the average. The
determination of the precise values requires a separate calculation, which it is only worth
formulating once a consensus has developed with relation to the above proposals.
5.4.2. Pension Points That Are Based on Community Contributions
All taxpayers, whether they raise children directly or not, also receive pension points
with respect to the level of their community contributions, i.e., the “c” part of the total
number of points with respect to raised children. In order to determine the number of points
that may be distributed and the ratio of distribution, several problems must be solved.
In view of the fact that it is recommended that points are distributed continuously
(based on a suitable set of records) each year, it is clear how many points may be distributed
in total with respect to the number of children—a total of 1/18 point per year per child,
although some of these will later be regarded as invalid because of a lack of a secondary
school leaving certificate. However, this will hopefully not be significant, and accordingly
we may disregard it during the calculation of the c part. Since this is equivalent to the “i”
part of the points, this community point multiplied by c/i must still be distributed among
all taxpayers in proportion to their tax payments. However as one of the reviewers of
the paper has correctly pointed out, in countries such as Israel that have a childless tax,
the tax behaves much more like an individual targeted child-raising contribution than
child-raising funding provided via general taxes (meaning it behaves as i rather than c),
and in such special cases the accumulation of points must be amended accordingly.
Unfortunately, we do not possess (and in theory cannot possess) a set of records
concerning who pays what level of taxes, since there are many types of tax, from personal
income tax to consumer tax. For this reason, in order to distribute community points, the
ratio of taxes paid by individuals must be estimated in some way, meaning we must apply
some kind of proxy. In addition, it is expedient to narrow down the period during which
points are acquired through paying taxes, because for instance a pensioner also pays taxes,
but by that time it will be difficult to amend the number of pension points accordingly. It is
expedient to limit the acquisition of points to the period of active employment only, or the
contribution payment.
The payment of contributions could be an obvious proxy for tax payment, since it
is proportional to earnings and personal income tax, and the value-added tax paid with
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respect to consumption is probably also proportional to wages. However, there are two
arguments against this idea:
1. Above, we recommended that the payment of contributions should not extend to
an individual’s whole active career, but to a shorter period (e.g., 30 or 35 years). Of
course, it is also possible to generate a good estimate of the ratio of taxes paid during
the course of a whole career based on a shorter, although sufficiently long, period, but
it is expedient to choose as long a period as possible, because the approach will be all
the more correct.
2. People could easily confuse this acquisition of rights with the acquisition of rights
that occurs within the current PAYG system, and it would be difficult to explain to
them that in this case we are talking about something completely different.
Particularly in view of the latter argument, we recommend an estimation based on
the amount of personal income tax paid, data which are also readily available with respect
to everyone.
Based on the above, we arrive at a logical rule for the distribution of community
points—every year, the community points for that year must be distributed among ac-
tive workers who have paid personal income tax for that year, in proportion to their
tax payments.
6. Interaction between the System’s Elements
In order for the above elements to interact well, they must be configured well with
respect to each other. For instance, it must be determined when contributions or savings
onto individual accounts should be paid, and how the HC system and FF subsystem should
be linked to each other.
6.1. Normal Retirement Age
In view of the fact that we have recommended that the FF and HC subsystems should
not be parallel, but consecutive, two retirement ages are required, as well as an age limit
for the payment of contributions, all of which are interrelated. The centrally important age
limit is “the” normal age of retirement, to which the other two may be associated. The
normal age of retirement is the age limit for people who have raised “enough” children.
What counts as enough may partly be determined based on the GBE but may in part be
determined freely. The more children we include, the higher the starting pension, and vice
versa. It is expedient to determine this in such a way that its level corresponds roughly
to what enables the achievement of the current average pension. This requires a certain
amount of calculation, and for the sake of simplicity we shall hereafter assume that this is
one child per head, or two per married couple. We might also express this by stating that
the normal age of retirement covers people whose pension points, based on their individual
contribution, reaches 1.
Important to note, that in the above, for practical reasons and temporarily, we have
already put forward a proposal with respect to the fact that this logic should be reversed
and the current average pension should be set to a level that corresponds to the raising
of one child (two per couple). However, the “correct” logic, which should be gradually
introduced later, is the one described above.
The normal age of retirement is, as we know, the age at which the expected remaining
lifetime is a previously set value. We recommend that this value should be 15 years (which
in Hungary today means an age of retirement of a little over 65 years—based on Table 1, in
2017 this was somewhere around 67.5 years).
6.2. Increased Retirement Age
We have proposed that people who do not raise children should have a higher age of
retirement. It should be higher to an extent that ensures that their pension level is similar
to that of people who have acquired at least one pension point. This may be achieved by
setting the “increased retirement age” to the age at which the last part of the expected
Risks 2021, 9, 66 16 of 32
remaining lifetime begins in the case of a normal age of retirement. This may be calculated
based on c and the ratio of all taxpayers to taxpayers with children. This therefore applies
to people who have a zero number of individual pension points. A weighted average of the
two retirement ages would apply to people with a transitional number of pension points.
Based on Table 3, this increased retirement age would be somewhere around the age of 82,
if this ratio were 0.34 × 0.7 = 0.24, for instance. If the state increases this to for instance 0.5
via benefits for people with children, then the age limit would be 76.
Table 3. Life expectancy (based on the 2017 Hungarian unisex mortality table) and what percentage of the life expectancy
(LE) at age 67 exceeds the given age.
Age (x) LE
% of Expected
Remaining
Lifetime
Age (x) LE
% of Expected
Remaining
Lifetime
Age (x) LE
% of Expected
Remaining
Lifetime
67 15.31 100% 75 10.34 54% 83 6.24 20.4%
68 14.67 94% 76 9.77 49% 84 5.85 17.3%
69 14.04 87% 77 9.19 44% 85 5.44 14.6%
70 13.41 81% 78 8.65 40% 86 5.09 12.1%
71 12.79 76% 79 8.12 35% 87 4.76 9.9%
72 12.15 70% 80 7.62 31% 88 4.48 8.0%
73 11.54 64% 81 7.12 27.3% 89 4.21 6.4%
74 10.94 59% 82 6.67 23.7% 90 3.94 5.0%
Source: mortality.org + own calculations.
Nota bene, that no one should be fooled by the fact that 82 does no split the 15 years
following the age of 67 to a ratio of 76:24, because an expected remaining lifetime at the
age of 67 does not mean that we will live for another 15 years. Many people will live for
much longer.
In the Table 3 the calculation was performed using a period life table because in
Hungary, similarly to most countries, it is the only one available. In future, however, if
age limit indexing is introduced, it would be expedient to switch to using the cohort life
table (or the “projected” mortality rate table, as I referred to it in Banyár (2016b)), i.e., we
should not start out from a mortality “snapshot” but use the remaining life expectancy
of the given cohort, and of course regularly prepare the related mortality tables. For the
differences between the two tables see Ayuso et al. (2021).
Naturally, people who go into retirement later for whatever reason receive a propor-
tionately higher pension. This may be achieved by recalculating their pension points. It
may be stated that pension points (whether individual or community) apply to the normal
retirement age. In the case of people who retire later (or later than the age of retirement that
is valid in their particular case), their pension points must be multiplied by the amount by
which the expected remaining lifetime at the normal age of retirement exceeds the expected
remaining lifetime at the time when the individual actually goes into retirement.
6.3. The Age Limit for the Commencement of Contribution Payments
Having determined a predetermined period of contribution payments that is shorter
than the active career is justified, it is not absolutely clear when the payment of contribu-
tions should actually begin. There are two clear options—it should begin immediately,
together with the active career (as is currently the case within the PAYG system); or it
should begin later and last until the normal age of retirement. There is no justification
for the payment of contributions ending later than the normal retirement age, because
in principle everyone can retire at that time—although some will begin depleting their
pension savings. At this time, the age limit for the start of contribution payments must be
reverse-calculated based on this. All other cases fall somewhere between these two.
From among the possibilities, such an intermediate case is most justified in which
the end of the contribution payment period falls close to the normal retirement age. The
reasons are as follows.
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1. In most cases, salaries are generally higher in the second half of the career than they
are in the first half, meaning people can in part pay a higher level of contributions,
and in part will find it easier to live without those missing resources. We might state
that at this time the human capital investment realized by the parents (and society)
begins to bear fruit.
2. It is expedient not to also burden the first phase of an active working career with
additional contribution payments, since this is usually the period during which the
majority of people undertake to have children, which is already a major expense in
itself. Accordingly, the system also encourages the investment in human capital by
exempting young people from having to pay other expenses to some extent during a
period that is most logical for this purpose. By doing so, it otherwise also shepherds
them towards starting a family relatively (compared to today’s high ages) early.
3. It is however expedient not to “push” the contribution payment period fully onto
the normal age of retirement, but instead to leave a certain “margin”—5 years, for
instance—in view of the fact that there may be deferments to contribution payments,
when the individual suspends them.
In summary, the recommended age limit for the commencement of contribution
payments = normal retirement age − contribution payment period (e.g., 30 years) −
contribution payment margin (e.g., 5 years). Accordingly, this age limit will be indexed
together with the normal retirement age. In the above example, if the age of retirement is
67, then the age limit for the commencement of contribution payments is 32.
6.4. Making Raising Children and Savings Financially Independent
In view of the fact that within the HC system raising children would continue to be a
voluntary decision, people who do not undertake to do so would not receive a pension
from the state system. It is, however, expedient for the state to also facilitate the pensions of
these people, meaning it should operate a fully funded defined contribution (DC) system
for them. The accumulation of savings within this system cannot, however, occur at the
last moment when, possibly in contrast to original plans, it transpires that someone will
not be having children after all. On the contrary, it is worth departing from the assumption
that someone will not have a child, and then make continuous amendments if it transpires
that they will be having one.
Accordingly, savings for pension purposes (payment into the FF system) should begin
at the earliest opportunity, at the beginning of the active working career. Based on the
above, everyone additionally has a good opportunity to do so at this time, since they
will not yet have to pay pension contributions and, in view of the relatively long savings
period, will be able to accumulate a large sum of capital until retirement with relatively
small payments.
However, an individual will have less need for these savings if they have a child, and
no need at all if a second child is born. For this reason, we recommend that the mandatory
level of savings (the sum deducted from salaries) should be reduced by half on the birth of
the first child and cease to be mandatory following the birth of the second child (assuming
married couples). If someone wishes to, they may of course continue to accumulate savings
even after the birth of their second child.
These elements—the timing of savings and contribution payments—and the above
rules for their mutual interaction achieve the following effects:
• The fact that the payment of contributions begins later than the active career also
means that we leave young people with a stage of life in which they do not need
to pay contributions and can instead deal with more important things, e.g., raising
children. This means that this solution on the one hand shepherds young people
towards having children, and on the other hand makes the initial years of this easier
for them (providing they get down to the “project” in a timely manner).
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• If they do not have children, then they may put aside the money they save by not
doing so towards their pension, since in this case their state pension will only begin
13–15 years later than everyone else’s.
• However, if they do have a child after all, then they will not have to bother with these
savings, because money will inherently become available for the “project”.
• As a result, the issue of whether they accumulate savings or decide to have children
will be financially neutral to them, which would be a major step forward compared to
the current situation, in which undertaking to have children clearly means a financial
step backwards.
6.5. The Functioning of Annuities within the FF System
At the beginning of the normal retirement age, the money accumulated within a state
FF system set up in this manner would not begin to be disbursed in the form of a life
annuity but would simply be distributed evenly over the number of months remaining
until the commencement of state pension services (e.g., 13 years × 12 months = 156 equal
parts). The pensioner will receive this sum each month, plus the interest accumulated in
the meantime, unless they decide to continue working past the age of retirement and do
not wish to withdraw the money. This sum (or rather the sum not spent by its owner) will
become inheritable in such a manner that the default heir will be the spouse/registered
partner, who by default will also be able to spend it on their pension.
However, it is by no means certain that the capital accumulated within the FF system
will be paid out with respect to a pension or inheritance, because it is recommended that
these savings are given a kind of guaranteeing role. If, for instance, someone has not fully
repaid the costs of having been raised (meaning they have not paid contributions for a long
enough period), then that sum may also be deducted from the money that has accumulated
within the FF system.
7. Transition from Current System to New System
The above system may be introduced without problems for young people who are
just developing an individual pension structure and are able to adapt to any system. It is,
however, problematic to introduce it with respect to people who have lived a significant
part of their lives adapting to a totally different pension philosophy.
Because of this, it may be expedient to introduce the system in such a manner that we
make the keeping of an individual pension savings account mandatory for people under a
certain age, e.g., 55 (while people over this age limit will continue using the current pension
system) who are raising fewer than two children, and then continuously increase the age
of retirement in their case (which will become the increased retirement age within the final
system), at which time they will be able to go into retirement compared to people with
two children, in such a way that they also receive a pension from the HC system. One
possibility could be a one-year increase every two years (in addition to normal retirement
age indexing), until the increased retirement age reaches the theoretical value. This also
means that during the transitional phase people have 2 years available to make up for their
one year of missing the pension out of their own savings. People who are scheduled to
retire in 2 years’ time will only have one year accumulated but will only have to make up
for one year, etc., meaning everyone would be able to adapt gradually to the new system.
A system of this kind cannot be introduced without a high level of social and political
support. It must be agreed with not only by the current governing authorities, but also by
the government which will probably replace it in the future. However, a political accord
of this nature can only be rooted in a broad acceptance on the part of those affected (i.e.,
active voters under a given age), the first step of which is that they become aware of the
concept at all and understand the principles behind the new system. Therefore, this is the
first step in the realization of the HC system, and also the greatest difficulty in relation to
its actual implementation—its broad dissemination among the general public.
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Appendix A
In Banyár (2014), I supplemented Samuelson’s original model (Samuelson 1958), in
which the lifetime consisted of three periods (young active, middle-aged active and old
inactive) with a fourth life period, the inactive child period, and I took into account the
consumption of the child. The biological interest payable to old inactives has disappeared
from the thus-supplemented model, which may be illustrated in the diagrams below (for
the sake of simplicity, I only present the stationary case in the Figure A1, although an
increasing population would also have no tangible effect).
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Figure A1. The modified Samuelson model for stationary case when population is stable.
Hereafter, I present my argument not using the original Samuelson model, but using
the model developed further by Diamond (Diamond 1965). It is interesting to note that
neither Samuelson in his original article nor Diamond wanted primarily to model the
pension system; this was merely a necessary intermediate step towards the different
messages they wished to put forward (which otherwise also differed from each other).
Diamond immediately reduced Samuelson’s number of life periods to two—young
active and old inactive—because his thesis did not require a differentiation between the
two groups of active workers. He did, however, transpose Samuelson’s approach, whereby
he did not deal with children and their consumption, but assumed that they were given,
via population growth, and were available at no cost. Below, I start out from the Diamond–
Samuelson model, which has since become a standard instrument, as included in today’s
textbooks, and specifically in Heijdra (2009) and in Blake (2006), which builds on the first
edition of Heijdra’s work. The main deviation from them is that in my model, raising a
child, which is represented by children’s consumption, is not exogenic, but follows from
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the model, and accordingly I have added another initial life period to the above two,
meaning that in my model there are not two periods, but three—child (CH), in addition
to young (Y) and old (O). As a result, the numbering shifts compared to the textbook
model—children living in period t were born in year t − 1. However, I did not interfere
with the Diamond–Samuelson model’s suggestion that optimization should not occur at
the beginning of the lifetime, but at the beginning of the active career, since it is then that
people are in a position to choose, and they are not yet able to do so when children. This
means that for an optimizer, their own childhood consumption is not included in the utility
optimization of their lifetime. Rather, the consumption of their child reduces this, although
the child itself does have its own usefulness, and in my model raising a child (the child’s
consumption) becomes an investment.
I have made use of the symbols used by Blake and Heijdra, who used the following
notations paraphrased from Diamond:
Lt: the number of people born in period t. They remain alive throughout all three life
periods and die simultaneously at the end of the third period.
nt: number of children per young adult: LtLt−1
CCHt , C
Y
t , C
O
t : the consumption of the various generations within period t.
Wt: the wages earned by young adults within period t.
St: the savings of young adults within period t.
rt: the interest rate.
1 + ρ: old-age preference for consumption in comparison to consumption when young.
U and UCH: utility functions relating to consumption and having children, which we
assume may be additively separated.
Capital is in the possession of the older generation, which they will sell in full to the
younger generation to pay for their old-age consumption. There is no inheriting.
The most basic notations as a function of time and generations are included in the
following Table A1:
Table A1. The most basic notations as a function of time.
Time→
Born ↓ t − 1 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3
t − 1 childrenLt−1, CCHt−1
young
Lt−1, Wt, CYt , St
old
COt+1, Lt−1
t childrenLt, CCHt
young
Lt,
Wt+1, CYt+1, St+1
old
COt+2, Lt
t + 1 childrenLt+1, CCHt+1
young
Lt+1, Wt+2, CYt+2, St+1
old
COt+3, Lt+1
Appendix A.1. The Basic Model—No Pension System
In this model, there exists neither a PAYG-style state pension system nor a HC pension
system such as the one I propose. In this case, at the beginning of their active career, active
young people are faced with the budget constraint of the next life stage:
Wt = ntCCHt + C
Y
t +
COt+1
1 + rt+1
In addition, the wage earned by a young adult must be sufficient to pay for their own
and their children’s current consumption, and for savings:
Wt = ntCCHt + C
Y
t + St
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Here, childhood consumption is not their own consumption, but that of their children.
If they (meaning an average young adult) maximize the utility function relating to their
consumption during their own remaining career
U
(
CYt
)
+
1
1 + ρ
U
(
COt+1
)
then the optimal consumption of their own children is ntCCHt = 0, and since C
CH
t > 0, this
is only possible if the number of children nt = 0.
In order for a positive value to be produced with relation to the number of children,
a positive utility must also be attributed to children, and accordingly we introduce the
utility function for children, UCH(nt). This is, of course, also a decreasing function with a
positive slope (UCH′(nt) > 0, és UCH′′ (nt) < 0), just like all other utility functions (see
Mihályi (2019)), but we also assume that the demand for children is not infinite, meaning
that the utility of children (at individual level) has a maximum, and therefore UCH′(nt) > 0
is only true up to a certain maximum number of children nmax, and from then on it is zero,
or possibly negative.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the consumption of a child equals an α
share (meaning α < 1), of the total consumption of child and parent (which we shall
denote using CYt ), and therefore the consumption of a parent’s children reduces the parent’s
own consumption by ntCCHt = αntC
Y
t (which as a result will be (1− αnt)CYt ). I use the
term parent in the singular in view of the fact that for the sake of simplicity the model
only includes one parent, meaning that in this case we are using the number of children
per parent, rather than the number of children per family. Raising children therefore
reduces the young adult’s consumption, and therefore consumption utility, by this amount.
However, their utility is increased by the children’s utility, UCH. Note: here, we have
taken α to be a constant for the sake of simplicity, but in reality it is generally a decreasing
function of the number of children. Due to its complicated nature, this is not examined for
the moment.
As a result of the above, the lifetime utility function is:
UCH(nt) + U
(
(1− αnt)CYt
)
+
1
1 + ρ
U
(
COt+1
)
where it must of course be true that
1− αnt > 0→
1
α
> nt
(where we know that 1α > 1).
This is what the young adult must maximize while taking into account the following
lifetime budget constraint:
Wt = ntCCHt + (1− αnt)CYt +
COt+1
1 + rt+1
= CYt +
COt+1
1 + rt+1
Naturally, it will also be true that
CYt + St = Wt
where St equals savings (for pensions purposes), and that
COt+1 = (1 + rt+1)St
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The Lagrange equation for maximalization including this limit is:
max
CYt ,C
O
t+1,nt
ΨYt = UCH(nt) + U
(
(1− αnt)CYt
)
+
1
1 + ρ
U
(
COt+1
)
+λt
(
Wt − CYt −
COt+1
1 + rt+1
)
The criteria for maximum (and minimum) values are:
(1− αnt)CYt U′
(
(1− αnt)CYt
)
− λt = 0
1
1 + ρ
U′
(
COt+1
)
− λt
1
1 + rt+1
= 0
UCH′(nt)− αCYt U′
(
(1− αnt)CYt
)
= 0
meaning that by eliminating λt we receive two minimum–maximum criteria:
(1− αnt)CYt U′
(
(1− αnt)CYt
)
=
1 + rt+1
1 + ρ
U′
(
COt+1
)
UCH′(nt) = αCYt U
′
(
(1− αnt)CYt
)
The latter determines the number of children that are born. If we rearrange the
equation, we obtain:
UCH′(nt)
αCYt
= U′
(
(1− αnt)CYt
)
or in other terms
UCH′(nt)
CCHt
= U′
(
CYt − ntCCHt
)
the interpretation of which is easy: the number of children will increase until the marginal
benefit of one cent spent on the children is equal to the marginal benefit of the resulting
reduction in consumption.
It may also be formally acknowledged (although I do not deal with this here), that
∂nt
∂α < 0, meaning that an increase in the resources spent on one child reduces the number
of children.
Appendix A.1.1. Concrete Calculation—With an Iso-Elastic Utility Function for Children
Let us take a numerical example, using the same assumptions as Blake uses. The
utility function is iso-elastic:
U(Ct) =
 C
1− 1σ
t
1− 1σ
, σ > 0, σ 6= 1
ln(Ct), σ = 1
For the sake of simplicity, let us take the unit-elastic variable (σ = 1), meaning
U(Ct) = ln(Ct). Furthermore, for the sake of simplicity, let us assume that the UCH is
similar, with the exception of a β parameter
UCH(nt) = βC(nt) = β ln(nt)
meaning that for the moment we assume that demand for a child cannot be saturated.
Then, based on the first minimum–maximum criterion, we find that
(1− αnt)U′
(
(1− αnt)CYt
)
=
1 + rt+1
1 + ρ
U′
(
COt+1
)
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or
1− αnt
(1− αnt)CYt
=
1
CYt
=
1 + rt+1
1 + ρ
1
COt+1
→ COt+1 =
1 + rt+1
1 + ρ
CYt
Here, all of the terms relating to having children fall out of the equation, since at a
young age the consumption of children is fully compensated by their utility. This means
that in this case we get the same consumption distribution at a young and old age as
we do without children (or similarly to Blake, who simply leaves children out of both
consumption and utility). Thus, we get this if we replace the results back into the lifetime
budget limit:
Wt = CYt +
COt+1
1 + rt+1
= CYt +
CYt
1 + ρ
from which it follows that (
CYt
)∗
=
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
Wt(
COt+1
)∗
=
1 + rt+1
1 + ρ
(
CYt
)∗
=
1 + rt+1
1 + ρ
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
Wt =
1 + rt+1
2 + ρ
Wt
As we know, the total consumption of children and the parent is
(
CYt
)∗, of which the
consumption of the children is only
(1− αnt)
(
CYt
)∗
We receive the number of children from the second minimum–maximum criterion:
UCH′(nt) = αCYt U
′
(
(1− αnt)CYt
)
or
β
nt
=
αCYt
(1− αnt)CYt
=
α
(1− αnt)
from which
(nt)
∗ =
β
α(1 + β)
Therefore, the number of children (at least in the case of concrete utility functions) will
clearly be a function of α and β, i.e., the resources spent on one child and the preference
towards children. Since
∂(nt)
∗
∂ ∝
= − β
α2(1 + β)
< 0
and
∂(nt)
∗
∂β
=
α(1 + β)− αβ
α2(1 + β)2
=
1
α(1 + β)2
> 0
the number of children will be a decreasing function of α and an increasing function of β,
which is of course logical—the more we spend on raising a child (increase α), the fewer
resources we will have for raising further children, while also consuming for ourselves,
but the relatively greater value we assign to raising children (increase β), the more it is
compensated for by the joy of raising a child.
It is also expedient to express α(nt)
∗-t and
(
1− α(nt)∗
)
from this, which are:
α(nt)
∗ =
β
1 + β
1− α(nt)∗ = 1−
β
1 + β
=
1
1 + β
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In this case, the total consumption of the children and the parent is therefore dis-
tributed between the children and the parent as follows. That of the parent is:
(
1− α(nt)∗
)(
CYt
)∗
=
1
1 + β
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
Wt
Whereas that of the children is:
α(nt)
∗
(
CYt
)∗
=
β
1 + β
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
Wt
If β = 1, then the consumption of the children and the parent is equally distributed. If
β > 1 (strong child preference), then the consumption of the children will be higher, and if
β < 1 (weak child preference), then the consumption of the parent will be higher.
Since
1
α
>
β
α(1 + β)
it will certainly be true that
1
α
> nt
The population will be exactly regenerated if
(nt)
∗ =
β
α(1 + β)
= 1
from which it follows that
α =
β
1 + β
The population will increase if
(nt)
∗ =
β
α(1 + β)
> 1
meaning
α <
β
1 + β
and will decrease if
α >
β
1 + β
These days, it is reasonable to assume that α < β1+β , in view of the fact that throughout
the developed world the number of children is below the population’s simple reproductive
level. Moreover, we may in fact be right in thinking that the number of children decreases
from time to time, since there are signs that independently indicate an increase in α and a
decrease in β.
Appendix A.1.2. Concrete Calculation—If the Demand for Children Becomes Saturated
Assuming that the demand for children has a saturation point, then the most expedient
course of action is if we assume that from this point on utility becomes constant. The
quadratic utility function, which points beyond this and indicates an absolute decreasing
tendency following the maximum, provides too complicated a result.
Let us assume that the form of the utility function is as follows:
UCH(n) =
{
βC(n) = β ln(n), ha n < nmax
βC(n) = β ln(nmax), ha n ≥ nmax
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If nmax is suitably large, then the above result will not change as a consequence. We
may state that since 1α > nt must certainly be true, then it is expedient for the value of
nmax to be the following (the maximum value is necessary; the minimum could, in theory,
be lower):
β
α(1 + β)
< nmax <
1
α
Appendix A.2. The HC Pension System—When Raising a Child Is Compensated Financially
Let us look at what happens if we regard raising a child as an investment, which
is repaid via the pension system, i.e., if we introduce an HC pension system. This of
course does not change the fact that raising children is a joy in itself, meaning it is a
“useful” activity.
If we assume that the costs of raising a child are repaid with interest in old age as a
pension (as was the case at an earlier point in history), then our equations will change as
follows. The utility function is:
UCH(nt) + U
(
CYt
)
+
1
1 + ρ
U
(
COt+1
)
where we have not included the consumption of the children (which is still ntCCHt = αntC
Y
t )
as a utility-reducing factor, since it will be a form of savings and has the same status as St,
the value of which will decrease as a result. Accordingly, it will be true that:
CYt + (1 + rt)αC
Y
t−1 +
(
ntCCHt + St
)
= CYt + (1 + rt)αC
Y
t−1 +
[
αntCYt + St
]
= Wt
where the element in square brackets
[
αntCYt + St
]
is equal to all savings (made for pension
purposes), partly in the form of human capital, and partly also in the form of “traditional”
capital. Since everyone must repay the costs of being raised with interest to their parents,
(1 + rt)αCYt−1 must also be deducted from their salary for this purpose.
For the sake of simplicity (and because it may be freely determined to a certain extent),
let us assume that the return on human capital will be similar to that of “traditional” capital;
it will therefore be true that
COt+1 = (1 + rt+1)
(
ntCCHt + St
)
= (1 + rt+1)
(
αntCYt + St
)
The lifetime budget constraint is:
Wt = CYt + (1 + rt)αC
Y
t−1 +
COt+1
1 + rt+1
In addition, it must also be true that savings are strictly positive (otherwise there
would be no capital within the economy), meaning
St > 0
→ CYt + (1 + rt)αCYt−1 + αntCYt = (1 + rt)αCYt−1 + (1 + αnt)CYt < Wt
The Lagrange equation, which now includes two limits, is:
max
CYt ,C
O
t+1,nt
ΨYt = UCH(nt) + U
(
CYt
)
+ 11+ρ U
(
COt+1
)
+λt
(
Wt − (1 + rt)αCYt−1 − CYt −
COt+1
1+rt+1
)
+µt
(
Wt − (1 + rt)αCYt−1 − (1 + αnt)CYt
)
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The minimum–maximum criteria are:
U′
(
CYt
)
− λt − µt(1 + αnt) = 0
1
1 + ρ
U′
(
COt+1
)
− λt
1
1 + rt+1
= 0
UCH′(nt)− µtαCYt = 0
We also know that if we were to allow zero savings, then the following would be true:
(1 + rt)αCYt−1 + (1 + αnt)C
Y
t = Wt → µt ≥ 0
but since we do not allow it, it will be true that
(1 + rt)αCYt−1 + (1 + αnt)C
Y
t < Wt → µt = 0
However, if µt = 0 then the minimum–maximum criteria will change as follows:
U′
(
CYt
)
− λt = 0
1
1 + ρ
U′
(
COt+1
)
− λt
1
1 + rt+1
= 0
UCH′(nt) = 0
It follows from this that the two minimum–maximum criteria are:
U′
(
CYt
)
=
1 + rt+1
1 + ρ
U′
(
COt+1
)
UCH′(nt) = 0
The first criterion, relating to the distribution of consumption between youth and
old age, is the same as in the case of the basic model. Of course, the budget constraint
has changed in the meantime, meaning we must also cover the repayment of the cost of
being raised.
The second, however, states that if there is sufficient money for savings then we
will have children until the limit value equals zero. If our demand for children was not
saturable, meaning our utility function did not become at least zero after a time, it would
mean that our savings are accumulated exclusively in the form of human capital, and
raising children would totally replace savings made in “traditional” capital. For this reason
alone, it is necessary for us to assume that our demand for children can become saturated
and has a maximum: nmax.
At this point, however, we may come to another important conclusion—within the
HC pension system, this maximum will always be realized with relation to the child. This
means that in this case we do not need to deal with the utility of children at all, and instead
may raise the question of in what manner it is expedient for society to determine this
maximum. Clearly in a way, while also knowing the production function, that welfare
is maximized, meaning that neither capital nor the workforce should be excessive. The
examination of this points beyond the framework of this study, however.
Concrete Calculation
Based on the above, let us assume that the utility function for children is:
UCH(n) =
{
βC(nt) = β ln(nt), ha nt < nmax
βC(nt) = β ln(nmax), ha nt ≥ nmax
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where (also based on the above):
β
α(1 + β)
< nmax <
1
α
The utility function for consumption is the natural logarithm function, based on which
we receive the following:
1 + rt+1
1 + ρ
U′
(
COt+1
)
= U′
(
CYt
)
or
1 + rt+1
1 + ρ
1
COt+1
=
1
CYt
meaning
1 + rt+1
1 + ρ
CYt = C
O
t+1
and since UHC(nt) = 0, nt = nmax.
If we insert the first into the lifetime budget limit, we get:
Wt = CYt + (1 + rt)αC
Y
t−1 +
COt+1
1 + rt+1
= CYt + (1 + rt)αC
Y
t−1 +
CYt
1 + ρ
=
2 + ρ
1 + ρ
CYt + (1 + rt)αC
Y
t−1
If we also assume that this is a long-term equilibrium solution, meaning that the
consumption by young adults was the same a generation ago, i.e., that(
CYt
)∗
=
(
CYt−1
)∗
=
(
CY
)∗
and this of course means that rt = rt+1 = r, then we get
Wt =
2 + ρ
1 + ρ
CYt + (1 + rt)αC
Y
t−1 =
(
2 + ρ
1 + ρ
+ (1 + r)α
)(
CY
)∗
(
CY
)∗
=
Wt
2+ρ
1+ρ + (1 + r)α
=
(1 + ρ)Wt
2 + ρ + (1 + ρ)(1 + r)α
and (
COt+1
)∗
=
(
CO
)∗
=
1 + r
1 + ρ
(
CY
)∗
=
(1 + r)Wt
2 + ρ + (1 + ρ)(1 + r)α
On the other hand, what the younger generation gives back to their parents is:
(1 + rt)αCYt−1 = (1 + r)α
(
CY
)∗
=
(1 + r)α(1 + ρ)Wt
2 + ρ + (1 + ρ)(1 + r)α
The sum of these three parts equals the total wage:
(
CY
)∗
+ (1 + r)α
(
CY
)∗
+
(
CO
)∗
1 + r
=
=
(1 + ρ)Wt
2 + ρ + (1 + ρ)(1 + r)α
+
(1 + r)α(1 + ρ)Wt
2 + ρ + (1 + ρ)(1 + r)α
+
Wt
2 + ρ + (1 + ρ)(1 + r)α
=
=
(1 + ρ)Wt + (1 + r)α(1 + ρ)Wt + Wt
2 + ρ + (1 + ρ)(1 + r)α
= Wt
In summary, in this model the number of children (which in this case is independent
of both young- and old-age consumption) will be the socially accepted maximum, which
is of course limited by how much we are prepared to spend on raising children (α). The
number of children effects savings, meaning it determines how savings are distributed
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between “traditional” savings (St) and savings that occur in human capital (αntCYt ). Since
we also know that
COt+1 = (1 + rt+1)
(
αntCYt + St
)
or
St =
COt+1
1 + rt+1
− αntCYt
and since 1+rt+11+ρ C
Y
t = C
O
t+1, therefore:
St =
CYt
1 + ρ
− αntCYt =
(
1
1 + ρ
− αnt
)
CYt
In view of the fact that we necessarily also require traditional savings (St > 0), it must
also be true that
1
1 + ρ
− αnt > 0
or with relation to the maximum:
nmax <
1
α(1 + ρ)
Appendix A.3. The Introduction of the PAYG System
Let us assume that the PAYG system is in force. This means that Tt is deducted from
the income of young people, but they receive Pt+1 in pension in their old age as a result.
Accordingly, young-age income is split into the following elements:
Wt = ntCCHt + (1− αnt)CYt + St + Tt = CYt + St + Tt
COt+1 = (1 + rt+1)St + Pt+1
The budget constraint is
Wt − Tt +
Pt+1
1 + rt+1
= CYt +
COt+1
1 + rt+1
When the current (t period) active generation was born, the number of children per
capita was nt−1, and this generation is raising nt children per capita. The relationship
between current contributions and pensions is:
Pt = nt−1Tt
We maximize the following lifetime utility function,
UCH(nt) + U
(
(1− αnt)CYt
)
+
1
1 + ρ
U
(
COt+1
)
which is the same as before, meaning the result will also be the same, since the T and P
values now appearing in the constraints are external attributes, meaning it will be constant:
(1− αnt)U′
(
(1− αnt)CYt
)
=
1 + rt+1
1 + ρ
U′
(
COt+1
)
UCH′(nt) = αCYt U
′
(
(1− αnt)CYt
)
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Concrete Calculation
Let us now use the same utility functions. In this case, we know that:
COt+1 =
1 + rt+1
1 + ρ
CYt
If we insert this, and Pt+1 = ntTt+1, into Wt − Tt + Pt+11+rt+1 = C
Y
t +
COt+1
1+rt+1
, the result is
Wt − Tt +
ntTt+1
1 + rt+1
= CYt +
CYt
1 + ρ
=
2 + ρ
1 + ρ
CYt
Following Blake and Heijdra for the sake of simplification, if we assume that the value
of t is now in equilibrium and has been constant for several periods (Tt+1 = Tt = T), then
we come to the following:
Wt − T +
ntT
1 + rt+1
=
2 + ρ
1 + ρ
CYt
Introducing the notation Ŵt
Ŵt = Wt − T +
ntT
1 + rt+1
= Wt −
(
1− nt
1 + rt+1
)
T
we find that (
CYt
)∗
=
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
Ŵt
from which young-age consumption is
(1− αnt)
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
Ŵt
and the part spent on raising a child is:
αnt
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
Ŵt
Whereas old-age consumption is:(
COt+1
)∗
=
1 + rt+1
2 + ρ
Ŵt
Lastly, the number of children will be the same as in the case with no pension system,
since it is governed by the same conditions. In other words, the number of children is not
changed by the introduction of the PAYG system. If α and β are constants, then the number
of children will also be constant from period to period, meaning (nt)
∗ = n∗ = β
α(1+β) .
Using this, we can then refine the equation for young-age consumption, remembering that
αn∗ =
β
1 + β
1− αn∗ = 1
1 + β
Based on this, young-age consumption is:
(1− αn∗)1 + ρ
2 + ρ
Ŵt =
1
1 + β
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
Wt − T + βα(1+β)T1 + rt+1
 =
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=
1 + ρ
(1 + β)(2 + ρ)
(
Wt −
(
1− β
α(1 + β)(1 + rt+1)
)
T
)
Appendix A.4. A Comparison of the Three Instances
We are accordingly examining three cases—one in which children do not give back
anything to their parents, who only raise them because it is a source of joy; my model,
the HC pension system, in which the cost of childrearing is paid back by children in
the form of a pension; and the case of the PAYG pension, in which parents give nothing
back to their parents, but there exists a state pension system financed out of taxes. Let us
examine two subjects in relation to these three alternatives—the number of children and
young-age consumption. As the Table A2 below indicates, while the no pension and PAYG
models produce the same number of children, which remains below the socially desirable
maximum, the HC model produces a higher number of children, and in fact the socially
desirable maximum number of children. In relation to young-age consumption, it is highly
probable that the PAYG system provides the lowest level of consumption, whereas the HC
system provides the highest, in view of the fact that in the latter case fewer savings must
be accumulated in the traditional manner towards a pension, because raising children also
counts as an investment towards it.
Table A2. Comparison of the Three Instances.
Number of Children Young-Age Consumption
No pension model (nt)
∗ = β
α(1+β) ≤ n
max 1+ρ
(1+β)(2+ρ)Wt
PAYG the same 1+ρ
(1+β)(2+ρ)
(
Wt −
(
1− β
α(1+β)(1+rt+1)
)
T
)
HC pension (nt)
∗ = nmax < 1
α(1+ρ)
(1+ρ)Wt
2+ρ+(1+ρ)(1+r)α
Note
Excluding special cases, more children are clearly
born in the case of the HC pension, in which
there are fewer barriers to having children.
Excluding special cases, young-age consumption
is clearly higher in the case of the HC pension
than in the basic model (see below).The situation
with PAYG is unclear, but it is probable that this
provides for the lowest level of young age
consumption. (see below)
Appendix A.4.1. A Comparison of No Pension and the HC Pension
The equations for young age consumption in the case of no pension or a HC pension
only differ in relation to their denominator, and even there only in relation to the elements
β(2 + ρ) and (1 + ρ)(1 + r)α, meaning that it is dependent on the relationship between
these. In view of the fact that we imagine the value of β to be around 1, whereas that of α is
clearly below 1, and ρ and r are both in the order of magnitude of a few hundredths, in the
majority of cases it will be true that
β(2 + ρ) > (1 + ρ)(1 + r)α
or differently,
β >
α(1 + r)
2+ρ
1+ρ
meaning young-age consumption will be higher.
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Appendix A.4.2. A Comparison of No Pension and the PAYG Pension
In the case of the PAYG system, it is expedient to begin with the form of the equation
for young-age consumption
(1− αn)1 + ρ
2 + ρ
Ŵt =
1
1 + β
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
(
Wt −
(
1− n
1 + r
)
T
)
since it is very similar to the form of the equation in the case of no pension
1 + ρ
(1 + β)(2 + ρ)
Wt
We can see that the fundamental difference is not caused by the size of T, but by
whether 1− n1+r =
1+r+n
1+r is positive or negative. In this case, the relationship between Ŵt
and Wt depends on the (1 + r− n) operator. If 1 + r− n > 0, then Ŵt < Wt, and vice versa.
The two are equal if 1 + r− n = 0.
This means that if 1 + r = n then young-age consumption is the same in the case of
both no pension and the PAYG pension, but PAYG consumption is smaller if 1 + r > n,
meaning that the number of children per parent remains below a value that barely exceeds
one. In view of the fact that this does not even reach 1 in the developed world, where the
PAYG system is in use, we expect lower young-age consumption in the case of the PAYG
system compared to the no pension instance.
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